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Shifting Sands? Consent, Context and Vulnerability in 
Contemporary Sexual Offences Policy in England and Wales 
 
Vanessa E. Munro 
 
Though the consent threshold remains fundamental to the demarcation of 
acceptable from unacceptable forms of behaviour within contemporary sexual 
offences law and policy, there has clearly been a shift in recent years in England 
and Wales towards more ‘contextual’ understandings and interpretations thereof. 
In many respects, this is a welcome development, which has the potential to at 
least partially redress the problematic assumption of a disembodied, 
individualistic and self-determining chooser, which critics maintain has 
underpinned many conventional (liberal) accounts of autonomy. At the same time, 
however, there are risks associated with this turn to context that require vigilance. 
More specifically, this shift has opened the door to greater reliance upon the often 
closely associated concepts of vulnerability and exploitation. In this article, I will 
argue that, while these concepts can be valuable in highlighting and challenging 
the constraining conditions under which (sexual) choices may be made, they can 
also be deployed in the service of moral and political interventions that entrench 
precariousness in the name of protection and / or increase surveillance in pursuit 
of responsibilisation. To assess their impact, therefore, it is necessary to explore 
the concrete implications of this turn for those most immediately involved. In the 
following discussion, I will do so first by highlighting some of its perhaps 
unintended, but certainly undesirable, effects in the specific contexts of sexual 
assault and sex work policy. Having done so, I will move on to explore what we 
might learn more broadly from this experience about the benefits, blindspots and 
backfire in using vulnerability as a lens and lever for the pursuit of social justice.   
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Whether or not one accepts George Fletcher’s insistence that “no idea testifies 
more powerfully to individuals as a source of value than the principle of consent” 
(1996: 109), there can be scarcely any denying the centrality of the consent 
threshold in contemporary sexual offences law and policy. Historical frameworks 
that conceptualised women as a form of (sexual) property, that conferred an 
entitlement of conjugal sexual access upon husbands, and that required evidence 
of a non-spousal assailant’s physical force overbearing the utmost resistance of 
the victim to establish a sexual assault, have been gradually replaced (at the level 
of doctrine at least) by regimes that centre on the existence of sexual consent. 
Although claims to a contentious notion of ‘public interest’ entail that there are 
still some forms of sexual activity beyond the reach of even the most capable and 
informed of consents (in relation to BDSM or HIV transmission, see Bamforth, 
1994; Cowan, 2012; Weait, 2005, 2016), for the most part, this binary marker has 
been imbued with a ‘moral magic’ (Hurd, 1996) that transforms impermissible 
into permissible personal contact, and thereby provides those involved with a 
‘legal flak jacket’ (Beyeveld and Brownsword, 2007: 6) against criminal liability. 
 
But despite the import that hangs upon its operation, the conceptual foundations 
of consent have attracted considerable criticism. In particular, the ways in which 
it has often operated to reinforce an unduly abstract and individualistic 
understanding of social living and self-determination has been challenged. 
Without dismissing the diversity of approaches within and across the liberal 
tradition (Nussbaum, 1999; Chambers, 2008), critics have challenged the 
assumptions underlying prominent accounts (for example, Rawls, 1971; Dworkin, 
1985) that there are spheres of social living in which people are genuinely ‘free’ 
to make their own choices, and that the world is populated by rational, detached 
and self-interested ‘choosing’ subjects (McLain, 1992; Ferguson, 1993; Okin, 1994, 
2004; Cornell, 1998). On the contrary, the need to situate individuals within their 
social environment has been highlighted as crucial to any adequate understanding 
of the ways in which relationships, norms and surrounding circumstances 
construct and constrain choice (MacIntyre, 1988, 1999; Sandel, 1982; Taylor, 
1989). This critique has had particular traction amongst feminists, not only 
because it highlights the relevance of structural power relations legitimated on 
the axes of gender differentiation (MacKinnon, 1987, 1989), but because it speaks 
to the ways in which women’s conventional association with care and connection 
– which is refracted in subtle but significant ways through an amalgam of cultural, 
familial and biological imperatives - has denied them the status of rational agent 
and ensured that their choices often lack the credibility attributed to those of men 
(Lacey, 1998; Friedman, 1989; Hekman, 1995; Frazer & Lacey, 1983).  
 
In many respects, the substantial energy that has been devoted to reforming the 
law on sexual assault in England and Wales in recent decades can be seen as an 
acknowledgement of the need to redress these concerns, to take seriously the 
impact of social contexts, relationships, and power dynamics (Munro, 2008a; 
Cowan, 2007), and to provide a model of consent that imposes a greater 
responsibility for ensuring ‘communicative sexuality’ (Pineau, 1996; Cowling, 
2003). The Sexual Offences Act 2003 provides, for the first time, a statutory 
definition of consent: a person consents when s/he agrees by choice and has the 
freedom and capacity to make that choice. In line with previous authority, it 
focuses attention on the presence of consent rather than the absence of dissent, 
but its specific mention of the need for freedom and capacity points to a fuller 
exploration of the surrounding power dynamics and conditions within which 
(sexual) choices can meaningfully be made. What is more, the Act provides a list 
of circumstances in which consent, and any relevant belief therein, will be 
presumed – conclusively or presumptively – to have been absent, which is 
designed to give an additional framework within which the meanings of choice, 
freedom and capacity can, and should, be discerned. Further, it stipulates that, in 
order to avoid liability, any mistaken belief in consent harboured by the defendant 
must have been not only honest but also reasonable in all the circumstances; and 
it specifically requires assessment of the steps that he took to ascertain consent in 
order to evaluate any claim to reasonableness. The driving rationale behind this 
was to more fairly distribute responsibility for communicating sexual desire 
between victim and assailant, and whilst it marks a departure from conventional 
subjective criminal liability, it was generally felt that this could be justified given 
the import of what was at stake and the relatively minimal action required in order 
to ensure that sexual contact had been agreed upon (Temkin & Ashworth, 2004). 
 
Although regulated, for the most part, through different legal regimes, there has 
likewise been an increasing acknowledgment in recent prostitution policy of the 
role and relevance of context. In the midst of long-standing (and often hostile) 
debates over the legitimacy that can be afforded to tokens of consent to 
prostitution made by individual sex workers (see, for example, Jeffreys, 1997; 
O’Connell-Davidson, 1998; Phoenix, 1999, 2009; Campbell & O’Neill, 2006; 
Scoular, 2015) has been an acknowledgment on all sides of the complex conditions 
and constraints under which commercial sex is often sold. Though the act of 
selling sex itself continues to attract no criminal liability in England and Wales, 
there has been an increased policy preoccupation with the ways in which those 
who facilitate a person’s prostitution and those who purchase sexual services 
might be held to higher account. As part of this process, there has been a growing 
emphasis placed upon the relationships, personal difficulties and structural 
dynamics that frame, and arguably undermine, any expression of choice or 
agreement that is tokened. Not coincidentally, this shift has been actualised amidst 
growing international anxieties over the phenomenon of contemporary ‘sex 
trafficking’ (and its associated challenges for border integrity, irregular migration 
and organised criminality), as well as the increased popularity of so-called ‘Nordic’ 
models of abolitionism within which prostitution is positioned largely 
unequivocally as a form of violence against women, to be eradicated via a dual 
targeting of supply and demand. Thus, section 14 of the Policing and Crime Act 
2009 renders it an offence for anyone to purchase or promise to purchase sexual 
services from a prostitute who has been subjected by a third party to ‘exploitative 
conduct of a kind likely to induce or encourage’ their prostitution. The Home Office 
has confirmed, moreover, that this extends to situations in which a person’s 
vulnerability - whether resulting from their young age, drug or alcohol 
dependency, history of victimisation, irregular immigration status, economic 
disadvantage, social exclusion or personal relationship with the third party - is 
preyed upon in order to initiate or perpetuate their prostitution (2010).  
 
In the rest of this article, I will explore in more detail the motivations that have 
driven these shifts, some of the tactics through which they have been 
operationalized, and their consequences for those people most immediately 
involved. While, in many respects, opening the door to context and inter-
connection has been a positive step that promises a more existentially accurate 
(and enriching) conception of consent, and a more engaged and critical reflection 
with the question of constraint (Lacey, 1998; Cowan and Hunter, 2008; Munro, 
2010), the aim of this article is to remind that it is far from without its dangers. 
Context is a duplicitous friend, and caution is required lest we submerge 
individuals’ capacity for agency and resistance under the myriad relational, 
structural and disciplinary constraints within which they seek to chart the 
trajectory of their personal life narratives. At its root, of course, this is an age-old 
dilemma between structure and agency: over where to draw the boundaries 
between influence and abuse, or constraint and coercion; over how to engage with 
‘false consciousness’; and what do about ‘adaptive preferences’ (Friedman, 1987, 
2003; Meyers, 1989; Chambers, 2008; Campbell, 2013). But I will argue that these 
debates have been given a unique flavour, as well as an urgency, in contemporary 
sexual offences policy, where the turn to context has increased space for 
discourses grounded in amorphous notions of ‘vulnerability’ and ‘exploitation’ 
and staked a battleground thereon for competing perspectives on the 
responsibility of the state, individual and ‘moral community’ to provide redress.   
 
Focussing specifically on contemporary sexual assault and prostitution policy in 
England and Wales, I will first suggest that the potential within contextual 
approaches to provide a more nuanced analysis of the complexities of the 
interrelation between agency, control, and choice has too often been undermined 
by protectionist and neoliberal agendas that – in complex, sometimes 
contradictory, sometimes complementary ways - recast victim hierarchies on the 
basis of over-inclusive, but also highly conditional and precarious, conceptions of 
who counts as ‘vulnerable’.  Having done so, I will move on in later sections to 
reflect more broadly on the implications of this analysis for current initiatives to 
increase reliance upon the concept of vulnerability as a lever for greater social 
justice and equality (Fineman, 2008, 2010; Turner, 2006; MacKenzie et al, 2014). 
 
Balancing Autonomy and Protection in Contemporary Criminal Justice Policy 
 
In respect of consent to non-sexual assaults, Julia Tolmie has observed that, 
alongside the criminal law’s conventional (albeit contentious) balancing of the 
social utility of an activity and the level of harm it has the potential to cause, 
contemporary responses have increasingly engaged in a further balancing of 
respect for personal autonomy per se with “concerns about its dilution because of 
the vulnerability of the victim and / or the circumstances of exploitation or abuse 
in which the activity takes place” (2012: 662). I have suggested above that a 
similar shift can be traced in sexual offences law and policy in England and Wales, 
prompted by and reflected within the turn to more contextual understandings of 
consent. The ways in which this has positioned vulnerability and exploitation in 
tension as much as in alignment with a broader commitment to personal 
autonomy has, however, only partially been acknowledged by policy-makers.  
 
The Home Office’s ‘Setting the Boundaries Review,’ which preceded and – in many 
senses – set the tone for the subsequent enactment of the Sexual Offences Act 
2003, confirmed the centrality of sexual autonomy and maintained that its 
primary focus was on supporting personal freedom to engage in ‘harmless’ sexual 
activity (Home Office, 2000: 5). But in its wake, a number of commentators 
observed that, on its underside lay a rather different ideology grounded in the 
need to ensure ‘protection’ of ‘the vulnerable’ and to maintain a shared moral 
fabric (Lacey 2001; Munro 2007). As the Scottish Law Commission subsequently 
noted, whilst this ‘protectionist principle’ in many respects reinforces an 
autonomy-led response by underscoring the incapacity of some persons (for 
example, minors) to give transformative consent, it also creates the potential for 
considerable expansion, applying to persons who are capable of consent but 
whose surrounding circumstances cast doubt on its quality. As such, it “does not 
sit entirely easily with using consent” (2007: 8) (at least as narrowly defined) as 
the sole threshold. Moreover, it is liable to generate particular tensions where 
transactions that might be seen to be overall beneficial to ‘victims’, at least vis-a-
vis their ‘pre-transaction baseline’, are marked and prohibited as exploitative (for 
further discussion, see Munro 2008b; Wertheimer, 1996; Wilkinson, 2003), or 
where the perspectives of ‘the vulnerable’ are marginalised in the process of 
evaluating the presence, significance and severity of any purported harm.  
 
While claims to exploitation tend to target acts of wrongful or improper use and 
claims to vulnerability are typically attached to identities marked by 
precariousness, they are fused, and often confused, for strategic purposes within 
contemporary sexual offences policy. Exploitation has become the amorphous 
abuse to which those deemed in need of protection are designated as vulnerable, 
and the language and lenses of vulnerability have in turn become increasingly 
powerful levers for initiatives that alter in myriad and complex ways the balance 
between freedom and coercion, autonomy and protection, self and other, and 
citizen and state. The deployment of constructions of ‘vulnerable’ citizens 
(Ramsay, 2008; 2010) and ‘vulnerable’ states (FitzGerald, 2012) in the 
justificatory service of a range of (often repressive) criminal justice interventions, 
including anti-social behaviour and control orders, for example, is increasingly 
well-documented. In the specific context of sexual offences, such constructions 
have also proliferated, and given the insistence in ‘Setting the Boundaries’ that 
freedom should be constrained in situations “where society decides that children 
and other very vulnerable people require protection” (2000: iv, emphasis added), 
they are clearly apt to produce controversial results. As discussed in the next 
section, the ways in which this can position the narratives of ‘the vulnerable’ 
against evaluations of their best interests, imputed to them by ‘society’ as a whole, 
and the potentially detrimental impact this can have in terms of both agency and 
security, are well-demonstrated in recent law and policy initiatives on sex work. 
 
Context and Vulnerability in Contemporary Sex Work Policy 
 
Although the ‘Setting the Boundaries Review’ avoided any detailed discussion of 
sex work, it established the broader palette for 21st century UK sexual offences 
regulation – grounded, as noted above, in a dual, but not necessarily harmonious, 
strategy of respecting personal freedom whilst protecting the vulnerable from 
exploitation – from which a slew of subsequent proposals, consultations and 
policy initiatives on regulating commercial sex were crafted (e.g. Home Office 
2004, 2006, 2008; Home Affairs Committee, 2016). These initiatives were also 
marked, of course, by International developments, in particular the UN’s Protocol 
on People Trafficking and the Council of Europe Anti-Trafficking Convention, 
which require state signatories to prevent and punish the exploitative abuses of 
vulnerability seen to fuel transnational commercial sex markets, even where the 
underlying transactions are entered into with the apparent agreement of ‘victims’ 
(for further discussion, see Askola, 2007; Doezema, 2010; Fitzgerald, 2012).  
 
In the past two decades, discourses of vulnerability have been laced through 
domestic policies on prostitution, with sex work and sex trafficking being drawn 
increasingly closely together and at times conflated (Carline, 2012; FitzGerald, 
2011; Phoenix, 2009; O’Connell-Davidson, 2006; Brooks-Gordon, 2006). In the 
‘Paying the Price’ consultation, for example, the UK government asserted that 
“vulnerability is the key” to young people’s and adult’s entry into prostitution, 
albeit acknowledging that its specific forms may differ since “for adults, economic 
vulnerability is likely to play as significant a part as emotional vulnerability” 
(Home Office, 2004: 33). Strikingly, this consultation, though in no way restricted 
in its substantive focus to youth prostitution, used a cover image of a young girl 
standing in front of a broken window: an image that, as I have previously argued, 
deliberately tokens vulnerability, both of the prostitute and of the local 
communities in which prostitution takes place (Munro and Scoular, 2012).  
 
  
Under the Policing and Crime Act 2009 – legitimated via the rhetoric of promoting 
sex workers’ exit and quashing the demand for commercial sex that is seen to 
entrap them – a requirement has been imposed upon those convicted of soliciting 
to attend compulsory meetings with a ‘supervisor’, designed to encourage their 
desistance from prostitution. Though initially ‘offered’ in lieu of conventional 
sanction, critics note that this is a conditional diversion and unsatisfactory 
engagement with ‘rehabilitation’ raises the prospect of increased criminalisation 
(Melrose, 2006; Phoenix, 2008; Scoular et al, 2009).  What is more, as noted above, 
this Act opens up to criminal liability any client who, knowingly or otherwise, 
purchases or promises to purchase sexual services from a prostitute who has been 
subjected to ‘exploitative conduct of a kind likely to induce or encourage’ her 
prostitution. Defending this strict liability intervention in the parliamentary 
debates that preceded the Act, Jacqui Smith (the then Home Secretary) insisted 
that “the mark of any civilised society is how it protects the most vulnerable” (HC 
Deb 2009, 524) whilst Fiona MacTaggart MP characterised those engaged in 
prostitution as “vulnerable young women with disturbed backgrounds,” insisting 
that “it was all too easy for such persons to fall under the influence of a dominant 
male, who exploits that vulnerability” (HC Deb 2009, 546; Carline, 2011). 
 
In a sense, of course, there is nothing new in this. Claims have been made in 
relation to sex workers’ vulnerability and exploitation since the time of Josephine 
Butler; and the empirical reality that selling sex – at least where it is an illicit 
transaction within an unregulated industry – is often a dangerous activity, with a 
high prevalence of poverty, social exclusion and / or drug addiction amongst those 
sellers involved cannot be ignored. At the same time, however, the ways in which 
these concepts are being deployed in contemporary debates to justify the 
paternalistic disciplining of sexual citizens conjures up new challenges. There has 
been a tendency to infantilise all sex workers, and in form if not in practice, the 
law has demanded extremely high levels of freedom from them if their clients are 
to avoid criminalisation. And while the recent Home Affairs Select Committee 
Report might be seen to mark a shift in tone, underscoring the need to 
“discriminate between prostitution which occurs between two consenting adults, 
and that which involves exploitation” (2016: 27), the Court of Appeal’s position 
remains that someone holding out the “lure of gain or the hope of a better life” 
could in itself suffice to coerce a person into prostitution, thereby opening clients 
up to criminal liability (R v Massey (2007) EWCA Crim 2664, Toulson LJ at [20]).  
 
This arguably over-inclusive approach can be – and indeed has been – criticised 
by those who emphasise the complexity of the socio-economic contexts within 
which sex work is entered into, the continuum of conditions of choice that may 
pertain therein, and the myth that any one of us has unconstrained freedom 
(Campbell, 2013; Phoenix, 2009; O’Connell-Davidson, 2006). Moreover, even for 
those who see inequality as etched upon the foundations of prostitution in a way 
that makes consent non-sensical, there is cause for concern regarding the extent 
to which conferral of the status of ‘vulnerable’ on broad constituencies of those 
who sell sex has promoted any significant reduction in their precariousness.  
 
A contemporary focus on ‘quashing demand’ has had very limited impact in 
disrupting commercial sexual interactions (Kingston & Thomas, 2014), except to 
the extent that it has rendered the conditions in which those transactions are 
conducted more risky, since negotiations may be more hurried, and locations for 
soliciting increasingly hidden (Scoular & O’Neill, 2008). Meanwhile, raids and 
brothel closures premised on ‘rescuing’ trafficked persons have had far wider 
consequences for all sex workers, often producing displacements that increase 
rather than alleviate their vulnerability (Hubbard et al, 2008; Hubbard & Scoular, 
2009; Sanders et al, 2009; Magin & Steinmetz, 2014). The pressure imposed on 
women convicted of soliciting to exit prostitution – through attendance at 
rehabilitation meetings – has continued the moral disciplining of sex workers, 
offering inclusion only to those who come to adopt ‘normal’ lifestyles (Phoenix, 
2008; Scoular & O’Neill, 2007), and has often damaged relationships between sex 
workers and outreach organisations in the process (Scoular & Carline, 2014; 
Carline & Scoular, 2015). What is more, it has paid selective regard to the complex 
and often conflicting narratives of the women themselves in accounting for their 
involvement in prostitution, and placed the onus of exit on their shoulders, 
absolving the state of any responsibility for, or obligation to redress, the 
surrounding social conditions that facilitated their entry into sex work, and make 
leaving it so difficult (see, further, Munro & Scoular, 2012, 2013). Thus, as 
Campbell has also recently observed, “while the dualistic image of the sex worker 
as both moral offender and victim persist within modern discussion” (2013: 173), 
a preoccupation with her vulnerability and susceptibility to exploitation has 
dominated current law and policy debates, justifying interventions which, though 
aimed at protection, have often had counterproductive effects in terms of exposing 
sex workers to increased risk, deeper social exclusion and more victim-blaming.  
 
Context and Vulnerability in Contemporary Sexual Assault Policy  
 
Though we should be cautious about drawing too many parallels across their 
distinct socio-political and regulatory contexts, I suggest in this section that a 
similar pattern to that identified above in relation to sex work may also be 
identified within contemporary responses to sexual assault in England and Wales.  
 
Under the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, a designation of 
‘vulnerability’ carries a quite specific meaning, and entails eligibility for special 
measures protections that can significantly improve complainants’ experiences of 
giving testimony. Though such measures are not without their own operational 
challenges (Burton et al, 2007; Hunter et al, 2013), in this respect vulnerability 
can generally be seen as having acted as a progressive lever for empowerment and 
participation. However, the relative ease with which this language is invoked in 
relation to special measures, together with the emphasis under the Sexual 
Offences Act 2003 on protecting ‘the vulnerable’ from sexual abuse or 
exploitation, has facilitated and disguised the application of this label in broader, 
and potentially more problematic ways, to actual, and potential, rape 
complainants. In its ‘Toolkit for Prosecutors on Violence against Women and Girls 
involving a Vulnerable Victim’, for example, the CPS acknowledges its intention to 
adopt a wide working definition, invoking the label of vulnerability to “describe 
the particular circumstances of a person, or a group, which might need to be 
addressed in order to ensure full and equal recourse from the criminal justice 
system” and / or to apply “to people who are at risk as a result of conditions, 
environmental or personal, which compromise their safety or security” (2015: 1). 
 
In line with this, several feminist commentators have also begun to highlight the 
ways in which women’s personal and circumstantial ‘vulnerabilities’ increase 
their precariousness to sexual assault. Stanko and Williams (2009), for example, 
having analysed – as part of a Performance Improvement Initiative - 677 rape 
complaints made to the Metropolitan Police in 2005, observed that 87% of 
complainants had at least one of four so-called vulnerabilities, defined in terms of 
exposure to rape plus disadvantage in relation to ‘social believability’, i.e. they 
were under 18 years old, under the influence of drink or drugs at the time of the 
incident, recorded as having ‘mental health issues’ or were partners / former 
partners of the alleged assailant. Whilst framing statistics in this way provides 
striking support for the authors’ hypothesis that perpetrators prey on vulnerable 
women, who are often then doubly disadvantaged within the criminal justice 
process, it risks over-inclusivity. After all, it positions as vulnerable anyone who 
(1) is susceptible to rape (which means any of us) and (2) either is under 18, 
drinks alcohol, or has had a sexual relationship (which means pretty much any of 
us). To be clear, this is not to suggest that the complainants in this study had not 
been victimised, nor to deny that many of them were in positions that reduced 
their resilience and ought to have attracted greater protection, but – as in the 
context of prostitution - deploying the concept of vulnerability in this very broad 
way in respect of sexual assault may be problematic. More specifically, it risks 
robbing the concept of its critical edge, flattening different experiences and 
degrees of precariousness, and skirting over the more complex ways in which 
situational and structural factors intersect to produce susceptibility to, and 
resilience against, abuse. What is more, as Cole has recently highlighted, this type 
of labelling strategy risks “muddling” a potentially important distinction between 
“those who are injurable and those who are already injured” (2016: 262).  
 
It is far from clear, moreover, that this approach will produce empowering results 
for the women involved, whether as actual or potential victims (Home Office, 
2007). Despite the formal shift to a communicative model of sexual consent 
discussed above, traditional gender stereotypes that position men as sexual 
predators and women as sexual gatekeepers have barely been disrupted with the 
consequence that, in practice, responsibility for sexual assault and its avoidance 
continues to be borne heavily by women. In this context, positioning women as 
vulnerable to sexual attack has produced distinctly less than progressive 
consequences, as illustrated in this recent anti-rape campaign by Sussex Police.  
 
 
 
Under the weight of considerable social media pressure, this first phase of the 
Sussex Force’s campaign was ‘foreshortened’, but the Head of Public Protection 
remained at pains to point out that “Sussex police is determined to continue to 
raise awareness of this issue and … target those who seek to exploit and abuse 
vulnerable people” (BBC, 2015). Of course, this poster quite emphatically did not 
target those who seek to exploit or abuse; and those who were targeted were 
designated as vulnerable, it would seem, simply by consequence of their being 
female and out in public. This provides a vivid illustration of the ways in which the 
label of vulnerability can be deployed to responsibilise and discipline women; and 
it is by no means an isolated example. The vulnerability of women who drink 
alcohol in the company of men has been an especially dominant theme but this 
acknowledgment of precariousness has done little to problematize constructions 
of ‘taking advantage’ of intoxication as an almost inevitable feature of 
heterosexual engagement (Cowan, 2008; Gotell, 2008; Ellison & Munro, 2009), let 
alone to increase protections afforded to complainants who were too drunk at the 
time of the incident to reason and communicate effectively, or to properly 
recollect events (Gunby et al, 2012, 2010; Rumney & Fenton, 2008; Finch & Munro, 
2004; 2007; Angiolini, 2015). On the contrary, the primary effect to date has been 
the creation of a series of rape prevention campaigns targeting women’s drinking 
behaviour. In 2012, for example, West Mercia police launched the following poster 
campaign, communicating the message not only that intoxication makes young 
women vulnerable to rape, but that the victim’s contributory responsibility in 
getting drunk before any sexual attack should occasion retrospective regret.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Once again, under the weight of public criticism, West Mercia Police apologised 
for any distress caused by “the nature of the poster” but noted “what we are trying 
to do here is put information out showing potential victims how to avoid becoming 
vulnerable” (Telegraph, 2012). A failure to ‘drink sensibly and get home safely’ 
makes women ‘more’ vulnerable to attack, and thus an onus is placed on them to 
manage this risk more diligently, or be left to regret their recklessness. A similar 
sentiment also lay behind the SMART initiative, rolled out by police in Northern 
Ireland but inspired initially by an idea from Sussex police. Based on spurious 
assumptions about when, how and why the majority of rapes are committed, the 
message of this campaign maintains that if only women would drink less alcohol 
and stay with their friends when on a night out, then they wouldn’t get raped. 
 
  
 
Again, in a sense, there is nothing new in these messages, but the fact that those 
providing the first line of response deem it appropriate to perpetuate and promote 
them tells us a great deal about the ways in which victim-blaming can be, and has 
been, legitimised by discourses of vulnerability and risk-management (Gotell, 
2015). For women in general, these campaigns maintain a climate of fear of sexual 
assault, whilst disciplining ‘good’ women to conformity with conventional 
feminine behaviours; for those who experience sexual assault, they invite self-
recriminations over what she ought to have done differently – and, by implication, 
better – to avoid attack; and for the public, they vindicate an attribution of 
responsibility, if not blame, to those who experience sexual victimisation, 
distancing the perpetrator from view in ways that may prevent justice (Gotell, 
2015; Bumiller, 2008; Munro, 2013; Gavey, 2005; Ellison & Munro, 2009). 
 
Discussing contemporary responses to violence against women in the US, Kirstin 
Bumiller has observed that “the victim-focussed agenda has contributed to the 
growth of administrative power exercised over clients who experience sexual 
violence…. This generally involves ‘retraining’ women to protect themselves from 
future violence as well as to seek help from professionals who can guide them 
through the process of psychological recovery” (2008: 64). A similar trajectory can 
be seen in England and Wales, and the contexts of sex work and sexual assault, 
discussed above, provide particularly vivid illustrations of this. Of course, there 
are important differences in the issues at stake here, several of which flow 
fundamentally from the fact that, while there is contestation over the extent to 
which prostitution is inherently harmful, it is barely disputable that sexual assault 
constitutes an act of wrong-doing upon another. But in both arenas we find a 
blossoming reliance on the concepts of vulnerability and exploitation to justify 
protectionist interventions that sit on the underside of a formal commitment to 
sexual autonomy; we find over-inclusive applications of these labels in ways that 
contradict or at least disregard the complexities of the narratives provided by the 
individuals themselves; and we find initiatives launched under the auspices of 
empowering the ‘vulnerable’ that all too often have served to reduce individual’s 
safety, limit their alternatives, increase their marginalisation and / or offer an 
inclusion that is conditional on conforming to less transgressive gendered lives.  
 
Vulnerability: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? 
 
In a context in which several commentators renowned for their pursuit of 
progressive social justice have advocated greater use of analyses grounded in 
vulnerability, I reflect in this section on some of the broader lessons that might be 
learned from the above experience in sexual offences policy regarding the 
benefits, blindspots and backfire involved in invoking this lens. More specifically, 
I suggest that this experience highlights the existence of two distinct but related 
junctions at which the progressive potential of the turn to vulnerability can be 
either furthered or frustrated: in relation to (i) the breadth of, and politics 
associated with, labelling ‘the vulnerable’, and (ii) the determination of 
responsibility for redress thereto. I argue that the ways in which these junctions 
are navigated in each concrete context is crucial, and must be subjected to 
sustained and critical scrutiny if the concept is to begin to fulfil its promise.  
 
The Politics of Vulnerability; Or What’s in a Label? 
 
Despite attempts to theorise vulnerability and exploitation across a diversity of 
disciplines, it is widely acknowledged that they remain both “ambiguous” 
(Fineman, 2008: 9) and “open-textured” (Hill, 1993: 632) concepts. On the one 
hand, this has been cast in positive terms – as enabling a freedom for progressive 
interpretation. But there are, of course, risks associated with invoking loosely-
defined concepts in law- and policy-making, particularly where they carry 
considerable normative force. These risks may be especially acute in respect of 
vulnerability, since, when applied in the context of policy-making, this concept 
acts as a label signifying a condition of precariousness and connection that can be 
experienced and identified at both the universal and particular level.  
 
For many commentators, a key benefit of the vulnerability approach is its radical 
departure from the abstract, disembodied and disembedded conceptions of 
human experience that, as we have seen, many critics have maintained are central 
to conventional liberal accounts of subjectivity, agency and citizenship (Fineman, 
2008, 2013; Anderson and Honneth, 2005; Kirby, 2006). In this vein, it is its 
universal dimension that is paramount – vulnerability is something shared by all 
humanity on account of the porosity of our embodiment, the interdependence and 
inter-connectedness of our existence, and the precariousness of our environment. 
What is more, it is something that must not only be lived with, since efforts at its 
eradication are futile, but something to be valued for its capacity to foster empathy 
(Fineman, 2008, 2013: Turner, 2006; Butler, 2004). And yet, the ways in which 
vulnerability is experienced will be highly particular, framed by the unique 
contexts of individuals’ lives, as well as by the variable resources for redress that 
are realistically available. In other words, vulnerability, though shared, is neither 
mutual nor symmetrical (Staslett, 2006), and some individuals or groups will be 
consistently more vulnerable than others (Chambers, 1989). At this - 
particularised - level, a designation of ‘vulnerable’ marks one out as existing in “a 
state of high exposure to certain risks and uncertainties”, and with “a reduced 
ability to protect or defend oneself against those risks and uncertainties and cope 
with their negative consequences” (UN, 2003: 14 (emphasis added); Chambers, 
1989). As such, while it brings back into view frameworks for identifying and 
challenging divergent experiences and degrees of vulnerability, that may be 
(temporarily at least) eclipsed by the universal focus, it ‘others’ the recipients of 
this label, marking them out as peculiar exceptions to the less precarious and more 
resilient norm, and often in ways that stigmatise and oppress, or further entrench 
their vulnerability. Moreover, when applied to groups, this label risks invoking a 
stereotyped and essentialist conception of their collective identity (Luna, 2009). 
 
While slippage between its universal and particular dimensions has at times 
obscured the scale and consequences of these risks, as Butler reminds us, 
vulnerability cannot be thought of outside a differential field of power, and – more 
specifically – outside of the differential operation of norms of recognition, which 
label individual instances of vulnerability and – in so doing – “change the meaning 
and the structure of the vulnerability itself” (2004: 43). A critical interrogation of 
the structural conditions through which precariousness is instigated and 
maintained is crucial, but so too is close and respectful engagement with the 
narratives of ‘the vulnerable’ themselves (Brown, 2011). Vulnerability has both 
objective and subjective dimensions and any ethically defensible, holistic account 
“requires that the (law) engage with the question of how ‘vulnerable adults’ 
incorporate the issue at hand into the ways that they interpret, and ascribe 
meaning to, their lives” (Dunn et al, 2008: 252). The context of sexual offences 
regulation discussed above provides a striking illustration of the dangerous 
consequences associated with deploying labels of vulnerability in the absence of 
this engagement. As we have seen, age-old binaries between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
women have continued to dominate the frame, and women’s perspectives on the 
causes of, and solutions to, their precariousness have too often been sidelined or 
silenced. Thus, on the one hand, sex workers are portrayed as childlike, 
marginalised, and victimised; but where they refuse ‘help’, they are cast as deviant, 
corrupting and blameworthy (Munro & Scoular, 2012, 2013; Campbell, 2013). 
Meanwhile, women’s perpetual risk of sexual assault ensures a vulnerable 
condition that must be managed diligently - by not drinking and limiting social 
activities – if she is to avoid censure for a contributory role in her victimisation.  
 
Acknowledging (some of) these concerns, Peroni and Timmer have recently 
drawn on Luna’s conception of vulnerability as a ‘layered’ concept (2009) to urge 
that when judicial and legislative authorities invoke the label in its particularised 
sense, they must be more specific both about why a group is especially vulnerable 
and why an individual should be treated as a member of that group (2013: 1073). 
Though such clarity is crucial, it represents only the first step to improvement. 
Determinations not only of who counts as vulnerable, but of what constitutes an 
abuse of that vulnerability, of whose vulnerabilities matter, and of which 
vulnerabilities the state will seek to redress, are not made in a definitional 
vacuum. Unpicking these ‘politics of vulnerability’ also requires interrogation of 
the socio-political contexts in which the concept is invoked, the motives 
underlying its invocation, the power interests at stake and its concrete effects.  
 
For women in particular, the focus on vulnerability as an integral component of 
our ethical lives raises further dilemmas. Recognition of men’s, as well as 
women’s, connection to others may loosen gendered associations that have 
assisted in relegating women to the private sphere or to low-value public roles, 
and as such may assist in generating progressive social change. But, it also 
undermines claims of women’s access to a unique ‘ethic of care’ (see, further, 
Gilligan, 1982; Held, 1993; Noddings, 1994), and while critics of such claims may 
be right to caution that they are experientially questionable and / or unlikely to 
provide long-term empowerment (MacKinnon, 1987, 1989; West, 1988; Rhode, 
1989), to the extent that they have afforded a measure of increased respect and 
standing to some women, the consequences of their dilution or, indeed, loss are 
likely to be complicated. Moreover, where the story that is told of women’s 
vulnerability is pitched at the collective level, premised on a claim that it is “more 
systematically related to gender relations and is of greater magnitude” than men’s 
(Young, 2009: 228), and this translates into a call for protection, anchoring our 
ethical lives around this concept may – paradoxically perhaps - have 
discriminatory ramifications. Indeed, on some accounts, the turn to vulnerability 
embeds women ever more deeply within familial and community networks that 
may nonetheless be the locus of their oppression. Kirby, for example, has 
maintained that one of the key contributions of a vulnerability-driven framework 
is “the reconstitution of strong social networks of belonging, such as the family” 
(2006: 191); but without significant reconstitution of the structures and meaning 
of ‘family’ itself, the progressive promise of this (for women) is questionable. 
 
Vulnerability and Responsibility: Hand in Hand or Pole Apart?  
 
Of course, the strengthening of civil society relationships need not be the sole 
contribution of the turn to vulnerability; an equally important consequence, it has 
been argued, will be a renewed and revived interaction between citizen and state. 
This brings us to the second junction highlighted above, at which the burdens of 
responsibility for redressing a condition of vulnerability are negotiated, 
distributed and discharged. It is at this junction, it might be argued, that 
vulnerability theorists attempt to “elaborate the path from acknowledging 
constitutive vulnerability to addressing concrete injustices”; a path that some 
critics have suggested has, to date, been inadequately charted (Cole, 2016: 262).  
 
Watts and Bohle have argued that the prescriptive response to vulnerability is – 
or should be – “to reduce exposure, enhance coping capacity, strengthen recovery 
potential and bolster damage control” (1993, 45-6).  For several theorists, 
including - perhaps most prominently - Martha Fineman, the state has a pivotal 
role to play in this respect, creating mechanisms whereby individuals can 
“accumulate the resilience or resources that they need to confront the social, 
material and practical implications of their vulnerability” (2013: 19, see also 
2010). In a context in which many critical commentators have been rather 
sceptical regarding the state’s entrenchment in, and collusion with, status quo 
power relations, Fineman’s approach here treads a now familiar (albeit, at times, 
still perilous) path of seeking to ‘use the master’s tools’ (Lorde, 2007) in order to 
action reform (see also Smart, 1989). Without denying that “institutions are 
simultaneously constituted by and producers of vulnerability,” and that they can 
be “captured and corrupted” or “compromised” by power dynamics and politics, 
Fineman maintains that a ‘responsive state,’ which makes it a priority to redress 
disproportionate precariousness and increase resilience, is not only a feasible 
ideal but an “asset” in the pursuit of social equality (2008: 18, 2010, 2013).  
 
Others have cautioned against this somewhat optimistic appraisal, however. Philo 
has insisted that adopting a vulnerability lens “risks deflecting a more critical 
stance on responsibility, blame even, in our accounts of who is vulnerable to what, 
where, when and why” (2005: 443), whilst Edstrom has suggested it tends to 
“force the analysis back to individuals and their bodies….at the expense of power 
relations, accountability, structures and dynamics” (2010: 217). In line with 
Scully’s critical reflections in relation to international level responses to sexual 
violence (2009), I have suggested above that experience in the terrain of sexual 
offences regulation in England and Wales lends some support to these concerns. 
In respect of both prostitution and sexual assault at least, ‘vulnerable’ women have 
been subjected to increased surveillance that has (re)positioned them as 
responsible for managing their own safety, often in the absence of the resources 
with which to secure change. Not only have such interventions been experienced 
as repressive by the individuals involved, they have effectively absolved the state 
of the obligation to provide more meaningful forms of redistribution or redress. 
 
To this extent, the turn to vulnerability can be read as having been co-opted by 
neoliberal imperatives that exploit the idealised persona of the suffering victim 
for broader political and penal purposes (Garland, 2001: 143), support strategies 
of governance that focus on managing those failing to act as self-responsible 
citizens (Rose, 1999, 2012; Dean, 2009), and reformulate social and political 
issues into personal or psychological ones (Brown & Baker, 2013: 13). Such tactics 
transform the meaning and parameters of responsibility itself – rather than 
conferring an obligation upon an active state to intervene, redistribute resources 
and restore resilience, responsibility imposes a requirement on individuals to 
“increasingly conduct moral evaluations of their actions in relation to their 
potential effects, calculating and designing their life courses in ways that attempt 
to mitigate harm and risk” (Trnka & Trundle, 2014: 139). Crucially, moreover, 
these enactments are staged “not only for the self but also with respect to a 
broader audience” in order to establish “reflexive prudence” (Trnka & Trundle, 
2014: 139); or, in the specific context of sexual offences, ‘non-deservingness’. 
Thus, the suggestion that vulnerability provides a conceptual and experiential 
lever through which to compel the state’s assumption of an expanded 
responsibility for its citizens can be cast into doubt, leaving individuals to tread a 
delicate balance on a transgression / vulnerability nexus (Brown, 2011; 2014; 
2015), with claims to responsibility providing a treacherous, victim-blaming 
baseline and little evidence of structural or socio-economic change on the horizon.  
 
But this need not be the end of the story. To the extent that the turn to vulnerability 
may have struggled to navigate unscathed through this junction, it can be read, not 
so much as an inevitable consequence of its conceptual fluidity in the face of 
powerful neoliberal agendas, but as a failure to fulfil its promise to provide new 
frames within which to challenge and deconstruct the associated retraction of the 
state. Indeed, Robert Goodin has maintained that the strongest defence of a 
vulnerability analysis lies precisely in its ability to “clearly finger” those who are, 
or should be, particularly responsible for seeing to it that a person’s interests are 
protected (1986: 117). Much may depend here, however, on our understanding of 
responsibility, and more specifically, on whether it is conceptualised – as it 
typically has been – in a ‘fault’ model where attributions serve to absolve others, 
or in a ‘social connection’ model where it connotes a shared participation with 
others to positively reform social institutions (Young, 2013). Whilst a 
preoccupation at policy level with particularised experiences of vulnerability (and 
the politics of ‘othering’ often associated therewith) has encouraged fault-based 
logics, recalling the universal nature of human vulnerability may provide both a 
balance and a temper to the more individualistic spirit of neoliberal 
responsibilisation. As such, in a context in which it has been noted that “a 
multiplicity of responsibilities can work with and against each other, sometimes 
reinforcing neoliberal responsibilisation and at other times existing alongside it 
or undercutting it” (Trnka & Trundle, 2014: 150), it could be argued that the 
potential identified by Fineman in relation to the ‘responsive state’, though not yet 
borne out in the context of UK sexual offences policy, is never entirely frustrated.  
 
Concluding Remarks: Back to The ‘Rough Ground’ of Consent 
 
The shift towards a more contextual understanding of consent in contemporary 
sexual offences policy remains, broadly, to be welcomed. It has the potential to 
address a number of the shortcomings associated with several conventional, and 
typically more abstract, accounts, and to create a discursive and analytical space 
within which to engage reflexively with the ways in which structural conditions, 
societal expectations, and relational connections construct and constrain choice. 
In so doing, if accompanied by a respectful (albeit never uncritical) attentiveness 
to the narratives provided by those who seek to express their agency within, on 
the basis of, and sometimes despite, these conditions, it can offer a nuanced model 
that more meaningfully furthers the ideal of sexual autonomy. But this is fraught 
terrain and the challenges for the development of such progressive policy are 
significant. Claims to vulnerability and exploitation, which have always been a 
factor in determining the point at which freedom is overrun by brute coercion or 
incapacity, have burgeoned and proliferated in policy discourses as the space for 
contextual evaluation has been formally expanded and legitimated. And while 
these concepts can provide powerful resources with which to express the limits of 
one’s freedom, to highlight the implications of disempowerment, need and 
precarity, and to make an intelligible demand for redress, as we have seen in the 
above discussion, they can also be deployed in uncritical or over-inclusive ways to 
support paternalistic and protectionist agendas, and / or to shift the locus of 
responsibility from the state to those individuals who directly ‘abuse’ or exploit 
another’s vulnerability, or indeed to the vulnerable individual herself. In this 
respect, these concepts and claims are themselves vulnerable, and must be 
handled - by feminist and other social justice reformers - with considerable care. 
 
A number of prominent advocates of vulnerability theory have emphasised the 
ways in which it provides a radically different vision of human agency, community 
and flourishing from that afforded by autonomy-based alternatives. But the shift 
towards more contextual understandings of the consent threshold has begun to 
trouble this binary, compelling critical reflection on the ways in which the values 
of autonomy and vulnerability simultaneously challenge, complement and 
converse with one another. Indeed, as MacKenzie et al have recently argued, 
“taking ontological vulnerability seriously requires us to rethink, rather than 
discard, the concept of autonomy” (2014a: 16). More specifically, MacKenzie 
maintains that if initiatives to redress vulnerability are not tempered by “an 
overall background aim of fostering autonomy, wherever possible” (2014b: 41), 
they are at perpetual risk of creating additional (‘pathogenic’) vulnerabilities that 
imperil individuals in their efforts to overcome situational or inherent sources of 
precariousness. I have suggested in this article that recent policy in relation to sex 
work and sexual assault in England and Wales offers a compelling illustration of 
this risk and its consequences for the lives of individual women. The aspiration to 
protect sexual autonomy by operationalizing a more nuanced and contextualised 
understanding of consent is laudible, and vulnerability clearly has an important 
role to play in our evolving understanding of that context and of the ways in which 
the state can, and should, legitimately intervene. We should neither seek to 
jettison context nor to abandon the lenses of vulnerability and exploitation per se; 
but we must ensure that sexual offences law and policy is hemmed in by vigilance 
against political manipulation, a commitment to democratic participation, and a 
critical eye to its concrete effects upon the lives of those that it purports to protect.  
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